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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Delay discounting is a construct originally developed in the behavioral economic 
literature. It is commonly seen as a behavioral measure of impulsivity, wherein a 
participant is offered a choice between a smaller immediate outcome and a larger delayed 
outcome (Ainslie, Haslam, Loewenstein, & Elster, 1992). Research has shown that 
substance using individuals tend to discount the value of a delayed reward at faster rates 
than non-substance-using controls (e. g. Heil, Johnson, Higgins, & Bickel, 2006; Kirby & 
Petry, 2004; Madden, Bickel, & Jacobs, 1999). Although not yet conclusive, research has 
pointed to several possible reasons for this difference. For instance, Ostaszewski (1996) 
looked at the relationships between personality factors and delay discounting and found 
that extraverts and highly impulsive individuals tend to have higher discounting rates 
than introverts and individuals who score low on impulsivity. 
Although there has been a considerable amount of research looking at factors that 
predispose an individual to higher rates of discounting, there is a dearth of research 
looking at protective factors for impulsive behavior as measured by delay discounting. 
One possible avenue of protection can be found in Hope Theory (Snyder, Harris, 
Anderson, & Holleran, 1991). Hope is a positive motivational construct that has been 
consistently linked to better mental health outcomes and superior academic, athletic, and
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work performance (see Snyder et al., 2002). Hope is posited to consist of 3 separate 
components which influence one another: goals, pathways (strategies to achieve goals), 
and agency (motivation to achieve goals) (Snyder et al., 1991). Hope relates to people 
perceiving probable future outcomes because they have the “will and the ways” to 
successfully get what they want out of life (Snyder et al., 1991). Over the course of the 
last sixteen years, empirical research has reliably supported the link between high levels 
of hope and positive outcomes in many areas such as academics, mental health, athletics, 
and physical health. 
In the area of academics, hope has been found to correlate positively with higher 
scores on achievement tests among grade-school students (Snyder, Hoza, Pelham, & 
Rapoff, 1997) and higher cumulative grade-point average for high school students 
(Snyder et al., 1991) and college students (Chang, 1998; Curry, Maniar, Sondag, & 
Sandstedt, 1999; Curry, Snyder, Cook, Ruby & Rehm, 1997; Snyder et al., 1991). Hope 
even has predicted prospectively college graduation and dropout rates (Snyder et al., 
2002b). 
In the area of mental health, higher-hope people have been found to experience 
less suicidal thoughts (Range & Penton, 1994), less depression (Chang, 1998; Kwon, 
2000; Snyder et al., 1997; Snyder et al., 1996), and less anxiety (Barnum, Snyder, Rapoff, 
Mani, & Thompson, 1998; McNeal, 1997). Since high levels of hope have been related to 
positive outcomes in several areas, it is possible that hope could serve as a protective 
factor for impulsive behavior. 
In addition, higher hope provides benefit in the areas of athletics and physical 
health. A study by Curry et al. (1997) found that hope scores predicted athletic success 
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beyond what was expected of the athletes due to their talent alone. Individuals with 
higher hope also tend to possess more knowledge about illness and engage in more 
preventative behaviors than lower-hope participants (Floyd & McDermott, 1998; Harney, 
1990; Irving et al. 1998). 
 In addition, research on delay discounting primarily focuses on the discounting of 
delayed outcomes received in the future. However, Yi, Gatchalian, and Bickel (2006) 
recently compared the discounting of outcomes received in the future to the discounting 
of outcomes in the past. It was found that there were no systematic differences in the 
discounting rates of participants indicating that individuals may view past outcomes in a 
similar manner as future outcomes (Yi et al., 2006).  
 Thus, the present study attempted to expand upon the delay discounting literature 
by investigating the relationship between hope and delay discounting. Furthermore, the 
present study attempted to replicate and expand the findings of Yi et al. (2006) by 
comparing the discounting rates of both future and past rewards using two different 
measures of delay discounting. A final purpose of the present study was to examine how 
individuals view both negative and positive events that have occurred in the past or that 
are expected to occur in the future. Specifically, we investigated if individuals’ 
discounting rates are related to the temporal distance of past and future events that 
individuals list. 
 Delay discounting may have implications for the identification and effective 
treatment of individuals with substance use disorders. Since individuals who abuse 
substances tend to discount delayed rewards more rapidly than non-substance-abusing 
individuals, delay discounting could be used to identify people who are at risk to abuse 
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substances. In addition, it has been found that the discounting rates of individuals who are 
actively abusing alcohol are higher than the discounting rates of currently abstinent 
alcoholic individuals (Petry, 2001a). These results imply that delay discounting is related 
to abstinence and that it could be used to assess the efficacy of treatment. Although delay 
discounting is certainly an interesting area of research with important implications, more 
research is required to strengthen possible applications. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Delay discounting refers to the amount of change in the value of a reinforcer as a 
function of temporal change (Ainslie et al., 1992). It is measured by offering an 
individual a choice between receiving a relatively smaller dollar amount today and a 
relatively larger dollar amount in a given time frame (i.e. $10 today and $15 in one 
week). This choice is thought to mirror the choices that individuals make on a daily basis, 
such as a choice between studying for an exam or going to a party. In this instance, one 
might choose to attend the party because it would be more enjoyable in the short term, 
while at the same time knowing that they may perform worse on the examination as a 
consequence. Delay discounting has been frequently used to study substance use 
disorders and results indicate that substance users typically discount delayed rewards at a 
significantly more rapid rate than non-substance users (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; 
Heil et al., 2006; Hoffman et al., 2006; Petry, 2001a).  
 Delay discounting is commonly represented by a hyperbolic function first 
developed by Mazur et al. (1987). This function takes the following form: 
V = A/(1 + kD)             (1) 
where V represents the value the individual assigns to the reward, A refers to the 
numerical amount of the reward, D refers to the temporal delay of the reward, and k 
indicates a participant’s sensitivity to delay. Larger k-values reflect higher discounting
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rates whereas smaller k-values represent lower discounting rates. The superiority of the 
hyperbolic function over an exponential function in representing delay discounting has 
been shown in numerous studies (e.g. Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Kirby & 
Marakovic, 1995; Madden et al., 1999; Mazur et al., 1987; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & 
de Wit, 1999). 
The vast majority of studies of discounting rates have looked at the discounting of 
hypothetical rewards. It is possible that individuals might discount real rewards 
differently because they would actually receive the outcomes. Several studies have 
examined participant’s discounting rates of both hypothetical and real rewards to 
determine if any differences exist (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & 
Kastern, 2003; Madden et al., 2004). All three studies revealed no systematic differences 
in discounting rates for real and hypothetical rewards, suggesting that individuals think 
about hypothetical rewards in the same manner as real rewards.  
As noted by  Madden et al. (2003), these results should be viewed with caution 
for two reasons.  First, even though participants did receive a real reward in the Madden 
et al. study, they only received 1 out of a possible 216 rewards. Thus, the majority of 
choices were, in fact, hypothetical choices. Second, both the Johnson and Bickel (2002) 
and the Madden et al. (2003) studies employed a within-subjects design which leaves 
open the possibility that participants recalled their responses from the first task and 
simply reproduced them on the second task (Madden et al., 2003). In a more recent study, 
Madden, et al. (2004) addressed these alternative explanations by using a within-subjects 
design and increasing the number of real rewards delivered. Results indicated that there 
were still no systematic differences in the discounting of real and hypothetical rewards 
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(Madden et al., 2004) providing additional support that this construct can be successfully 
studied using a hypothetical design. 
Although the rate of discounting can be determined several different ways, it is 
most often determined by modeling a procedure commonly used in psychophysical 
studies where participants are presented with a constant stimulus (e.g. light, sound) and 
an alternative stimulus which is increased or decreased until the participant deems that 
they are equal in intensity (Stevens, 1975). For the construct of delay discounting this 
estimation has been accomplished several ways. The first method was developed by 
Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross (1991) and involves presenting participants with two cards 
simultaneously. On one card the delayed reward is displayed (e.g. $1,000 in 6 months) 
and on the other the immediate reward is shown (e.g. $500 today). The procedure starts 
with a low immediate reward and this card is changed to a larger value until the 
participant switches from preferring the immediate reward. This procedure is called the 
ascending condition. Usually, participants are also presented with the same values in a 
descending condition. In this condition, the immediate reward is equivalent to the delayed 
reward and is reduced until the participant switches from preferring the immediate reward 
to preferring the delayed reward. In both conditions, the point at which the participant 
switches reward preferences is referred to as their indifference point. That is, the 
individual is indifferent as to which reward—the immediate or the delayed—that they 
prefer.  
 A variation on this method was developed by Mitchell (1999) where the reward 
choices are presented on a computer instead of on cards. Another option is to present 40 
choices per page (e.g. Yi et al., 2006). In the left column, a constant amount is presented 
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and in the right column, increasing or decreasing alternatives to this value are presented 
in a given increment. This method is employed in the current study (the Delay 
Discounting Task).  To reduce the number of questions a participant had to answer, 
Richards et al. (1999) created a computer program that included an adjusting amount 
(AA) procedure. This program adjusts which questions are asked of participants based on 
their previous responses, thus reducing the total number of questions asked. Another 
method for assessing delay discounting is the 27-item questionnaire developed by Kirby, 
Petry, and Bickel (1999). This questionnaire presents a series of choices between a larger 
delayed reward and a smaller immediate reward with three questions assessing each of 
the nine discounting values (k-scores) and is also used in the current study.   
To determine the agreement of the computer based AA measure and the Kirby 
questionnaire, Epstein et al. (2003) administered both measures to 78 smokers. Results 
indicated that the k-scores obtained from each method correlated highly (r = .82) and that 
both measures had similar degrees of correlation with amount of cigarettes smoked daily 
and neither significantly correlated with body-mass index, age, nor gender (Epstein et al., 
2003). However, results also indicated that the AA procedure tended to produce smaller 
k-scores overall than the Kirby questionnaire, a difference that was largest for small 
reward values. These results suggest that both measures for assessing delay discounting 
are very similar but not identical.  
 
Factors That Influence Delay Discounting 
 The factors that influence delay discounting are generally divided into two 
groups, Level I Factors and Level II Factors. Level I Factors refer to differences with the 
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outcome itself and include the length of delay, magnitude effect, sign effect, and domain 
effect. Level II Factors are individual differences among participants such as, age, 
income, culture, substance use status, and personality. Each will be investigated below. 
 
Level I Factors  
Length of Delay 
 The first factor that deals with the reward itself is the length of time until the 
receipt of the reward. This has also been called the delay effect. The delay effect refers to 
the fact that if all other elements are equal, a person will prefer an immediate reward over 
a delayed reward. Several studies have demonstrated that longer delays tend to produce 
higher rates of discounting (Chapman, 1996; Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Richards 
et al., 1999; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).  
 
Magnitude 
 Another factor that relates to the reward itself is what is called the magnitude 
effect. The magnitude effect refers to the phenomenon that people usually discount larger 
monetary values less steeply than smaller monetary values. For instance, an individual 
might prefer to receive $5 now instead of $20 sometime in the future, but may 
simultaneously prefer $20,000 sometime in the future over $5,000 now even though the 
proportion of the two choices is equivalent. The magnitude effect has been demonstrated 
with both hypothetical and real monetary rewards in a considerable number of studies 
(Benzion, 1989; Green, Fristoe et al., 1994; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Green et al., 
1997; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Myerson & Green, 1995; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; 
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Thaler, 1981). These results have been extended to health outcomes as well (Chapman, 
1996). 
 
Sign 
 In addition to the aforementioned effects of delay and magnitude, an effect of the 
sign of the reward has been demonstrated. The sign effect refers to the difference in rates 
of discounting for gains and losses, such that gains are typically discounted more steeply 
than losses (Chapman, 1996). This effect has been found in studies for monetary 
outcomes (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Benzion, 1989; Shelley, 1993; Thaler, 1981) 
and health outcomes (Chapman, 1996; MacKeigan, 1993). 
 
Domain 
 Finally, researchers have found that the domain or commodity type can influence 
the rate of discounting (Baker et al., 2003). Specifically, people may consider monetary, 
health, or vacation outcomes and the discounting rate usually varies between these 
different commodities. Chapman and Johnson (1995) found that people tend to discount 
health outcomes more steeply than monetary and vacation outcomes. However, monetary 
and vacation outcomes were not discounted differently (Chapman & Johnson, 1995). 
 
Level II Factors 
Age 
 The first Level II Factor of interest for delay discounting is age.  Considering that 
many people view infants as individuals who want all their needs met as soon as possible, 
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it would make intuitive sense that young children should discount delayed rewards at a 
greater rate than older individuals. Indeed, research has confirmed that children have a 
more difficult time delaying gratification than more mature individuals do (Mischel, 
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). In addition, Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) reasoned that 
children should display higher delay discounting rates because of the difficulty delaying 
gratification and found that delay discounting was highest in children and lowest in older 
adults. Another study looked at groups that differed in age and income level (Green, 
Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 1996). The groups consisted of a higher-income 
younger group, a higher-income older group, and a lower-income older group. Results 
indicated that adults with different ages but similar income discounted similarly, such 
that there were no differences in the upper-income groups. In addition, adults who had 
similar ages but different income discounted at different rates, such that the lower-income 
individuals tended to discount more steeply (Green, et al., 1996). These results may 
indicate that income plays a larger role in affecting delay discounting than does age.  
 
Income 
  A second Level II Factor that has been related to delay discounting is the income 
of participants. This is an interesting question because one would expect that poorer 
participants would view a given monetary value differently than wealthier participants 
would. For example, an individual who makes $20,000 per year would tend to place more 
subjective importance on a $1,000 bonus than a person who earns $1,000,000 per year. 
Since lower-income individuals view a given monetary value as more useful they might 
be expected to display the magnitude effect (lower rates of discounting for higher 
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monetary values) for lower values than higher-income individuals. If this were the case, 
one would expect to see lower discounting rates among lower-income individuals as 
compared to higher-income individuals. The results of one study (Green, et al. 1996) 
point to the opposite effect however. Specifically, lower-income participants were found 
to have higher discounting rates than higher-income participants (Green, et al. 1996). It 
has been hypothesized that this difference occurs because lower-income individuals may 
be more likely to need money sooner to pay bills or to meet other financial needs than 
higher-income individuals.  
 
Culture 
 A third factor related to delay discounting is culture. Du, Green, and Myerson 
(2002) conducted a cross-cultural study comparing the discounting rates of American, 
Chinese, and Japanese individuals. Although all three cultural groups discounted in a 
manner best represented by a hyperbola, one cultural difference was found. Particularly, 
American and Chinese participants discounted delayed monetary rewards more steeply 
than Japanese participants (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002)  
 
Delay Discounting and Substance Use 
 Delay discounting has been frequently used in studies comparing how substance 
users compare with non-substance using controls in rate of discounting. The hypothesis 
provided by the construct of delay discounting should hold that the average substance 
user would discount delayed rewards at a steeper rate than the average non-substance 
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user. This hypothesis should hold because substance users routinely choose an immediate 
reward (i.e. a substance) over a delayed reward (i.e. better health outcomes).  
Since tobacco is relatively widely used among the American public and its use is 
the largest contributor to avoidable death, it should be no surprise that smoking has been 
the subject of many studies involving delay discounting. Many studies have found that 
cigarette smokers tend to discount delayed outcomes at a greater rate than non-smokers 
do (e.g. Bickel et al., 1999; Field, Santarcangelo, Sumnall, Goudie, & Cole, 2006; 
Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds, Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004). One study compared 
current cigarette smokers to both non-smokers (individuals who have successfully quit 
smoking) and never smokers and found that current smokers discount delayed outcomes 
at a greater rate than the other two groups (Bickel et al., 1999). This finding was 
particularly interesting because it found that non-smokers and never smokers discount at 
similar rates. Two different interpretations can be inferred from these results: (1) those 
who successfully quit have either learned to value delayed rewards more than they used 
to or (2) those who successfully quit tend to have lower discounting rates than those who 
do not quit (Bickel et al., 1999).  
 Following a similar line of thinking, another study found that rate of cigarette 
smoking is positively correlated with rate delay discounting and delay discounting does 
not seem to make people vulnerable to high rates of cigarette consumption (Reynolds, 
2004). This finding indicates that the use of cigarettes can change rates of delay 
discounting and not that smokers inherently possess more rapid delay discounting rates. 
In addition, a separate study found that knowing delay discounting rates allowed 
researches to predict the smoking status of participants (Reynolds et al., 2004).  
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 Although most studies comparing smokers and non-smokers focus on discounting 
of the value of a delayed monetary reward, the pattern of more rapid discounting extends 
to cigarettes as well. For instance, one study found that  smokers tend to discount 
hypothetical delayed cigarettes more steeply than hypothetical delayed money (Field et 
al., 2006). 
 Much like cigarette smokers, research has shown that people who abuse other 
substances tend to have higher discounting rates. This effect has been shown with 
individuals who abuse alcohol (Petry, 2001a; Richards et al., 1999; Vuchinich & 
Simpson, 1998), people who are opioid dependent (Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Kirby & 
Petry, 2004; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Madden et al., 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, 
& Bickel, 1997), cocaine dependent individuals (Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 
2003; Heil et al., 2006; Kirby & Petry, 2004), and methamphetamine dependent 
individuals (Hoffman et al., 2006). In addition, alcoholics tend to discount hypothetical 
alcohol rewards more steeply than hypothetical financial rewards, although this pattern 
was seen in both alcoholic individuals and control participants (Petry, 2001a). A similar 
pattern was shown among crack/cocaine dependent participants, (Coffey et al., 2003) and 
among opioid dependent individuals (Odum, Madden, Badger, & Bickel, 2000) such that 
each group tended to discount hypothetical drug rewards more rapidly than hypothetical 
monetary rewards. 
 Comparisons of currently active users to currently abstinent users have yielded 
mixed findings. Specifically, one study (Kirby & Petry 2004) found that individuals who 
were currently abstinent from heroin had lower delay discounting rates than currently 
active heroin users. Conversely, both currently abstinent cocaine and alcohol abusers did 
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not have lower discounting rates than individuals who were currently using these 
substances (Kirby & Petry, 2004). These findings are corroborated by another study 
which found that there was no difference between abstinent and active cocaine-dependent 
individuals but contradicted by Petry (2001a) which found that currently active alcoholics 
had more rapid discounting than abstinent alcoholics. More research is needed in this area 
to clear up the current results. 
 An area which is similar to substance abuse, in that it is believed to stem from a 
common impulse control disorder, that has been investigated with delay discounting is 
pathological gambling. Several studies have shown that pathological gamblers tend to 
discount delayed outcomes at a greater rate than controls (Petry, 2001b; Petry & 
Casarella, 1999). Furthermore, delay discounting rates have been predicted using 
gambling severity scores of pathological gamblers (Alessi & Petry, 2003). In addition, 
many pathological gamblers also have comorbid substance abuse disorders. Research 
indicates that individuals with comorbid pathological gambling and substance 
dependence tend to discount delayed monetary outcomes at a greater rate than non-
substance-using pathological gambling individuals (Petry, 2001b; Petry & Casarella, 
1999). Thus, the data reveal an additive effect in that substance dependence and 
pathological gambling together increase the discounting of a delayed outcome more than 
each factor alone. 
 
Personality Factors 
 Another factor that has been linked to delay discounting is personality differences. 
One study (Ostaszewski, 1996) looked at the relationships between delay discounting and 
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several personality factors; namely, sensation seeking, introversion-extroversion, and 
impulsivity. Results indicated that extraverted individuals had higher rates of delay 
discounting than introverts, highly impulsive individuals had higher rates of delay 
discounting than low impulsive individuals, and sensation seeking was not related to 
delay discounting (Ostaszewski, 1996). Although, the correlation between impulsivity 
and delay discounting makes intuitive sense since delay discounting is often 
conceptualized as a behavioral measure of impulsivity, the relationship between 
extraversion and delay discounting requires more of an explanation. Ostaszewski (1996) 
posited two possible reasons for the difference in delay discounting rates between 
introverts and extraverts. Specifically, (1) extraverts have been found to view the passage 
of time more slowly than introverts (Claridge, 1960; Eysenck, 1959; Lynn, 1961; Wudel, 
1979) and (2) the increased responsiveness to rewards typically found amongst extraverts 
(Eysenck, 1967; Gupta, 1978). Since extraverts view time periods as taking longer, it 
may be that they have a more difficult time waiting for a delayed reward and, hence, 
respond more impulsively on the delay discounting measure.  
Although these results are intriguing, it should be noted that Ostaszewski tested 
individuals on delayed rewards of two different magnitudes ($100 and $1,000) and only 
the larger reward evidenced a significant difference in discounting rates between 
introverts and extraverts. Furthermore, the relationship between the larger magnitude 
reward and discounting rate was not especially strong (Ostaszewski, 1996). 
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Delay Discounting and Past Outcomes 
 Thus far, research has looked at delay discounting of future outcomes when 
presented with an immediate outcome. However, until recently, no research has 
investigated the possibility of discounting of past outcomes. Delay discounting theory 
would predict that individuals would discount past outcomes ($10,000 received 6 months 
ago) in a similar manner as future outcomes when given an option of receiving a more 
recent outcome ($7,500 received one hour ago). Recently, Yi, Gatchalian, and Bickel 
(2006) compared the discounting rates of individuals for future and past outcomes and 
found no systematic differences in discounting rates or functions. These results suggest 
that individuals are constantly comparing choices between past, present, and future 
outcomes when making choices. Interestingly, this study used the longer measure of 
delay discounting—the Delay Discounting Task—to evaluate discounting measures but 
did not evaluate if the shorter measure—the Kirby questionnaire—is a valid measure of 
the discounting of past outcomes. This information is important because if both measures 
are equally valid, researchers would most likely prefer to use the shorter version. Thus, 
one purpose of the current study is to determine if both measures of delay discounting 
obtain similar results for past rewards. 
 
Hope Theory 
Hope (Snyder et al., 1991) is a cognitive motivational construct composed of 
reciprocally related (a) pathways (strategies to attain goals), and (b) agency (motivation 
to use those pathways in the goal-pursuit process). In the vernacular, hope relates to 
people perceiving probable future outcomes because they have the “will and the ways” to 
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successfully get what they want out of life (Snyder et al., 1991). More than a decade of 
empirical research consistently has supported the link between high levels of hope and 
positive outcomes in relation to academic and athletic achievements, and better overall 
mental and physical health (Snyder et al., 2002a).  
Athletes with higher hope scores have been found to have an advantage over their 
lower-hope peers. For example, Curry et al. (1997) studied seven track teams by 
obtaining hope scores from the athletes and rankings of the inherent athletic ability of 
each athlete. It was found that the higher-hope athletes had significantly better outcomes 
than the low-hope athletes. Curry et al. (1997) also found that the Trait Hope Scale and 
State Hope Scale scores of female track competitors accounted for a large proportion of 
variance (56%) in their outcomes. Furthermore, Brown, Curry, Hagstrom, and Sandstedt 
(1999) found that girls who were attending a sport-focused summer camp had fewer 
thoughts of quitting their sport and formulated more goals related to sports. 
In the area of academics, research has consistently shown that students with 
higher hope scores tend to have better outcomes in academics in areas such as higher 
grade point averages (GPAs), lower rates of students dropping out, and higher graduation 
rates. For instance, hope has been found to be related to elementary age students’ 
achievement test scores even after controlling for perceived school competency (Snyder, 
Hoza, et al., 1997) In addition, Snyder, Harris, et al. (1991) found higher GPAs among 
high school students and college students. The relationship between hope and academics 
has been studied most vigorously in the college-aged population. Studies indicate that 
hope positively predicts college grade point averages (Chang, 1998; Curry et al., 1997) 
even after controlling for factors such as age, sex, coping with academic stress, and self-
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worth. In addition, a six-year longitudinal study (Snyder, Shorey et al. 2002) which 
tracked 213 undergraduate students from their entrance into college until the completion 
of the six-year study. Results indicated that high hope scores predicted higher cumulative 
GPAs, a higher chance of graduating, and a lower chance of being dismissed for poor 
grades (Snyder et. al, 2002).  
These achievement area successes may result from high-hope students’ abilities to 
retain their positive emotions even after experiencing setbacks. For example, Shorey 
(2003) found that, after a laboratory induced failure experience, positive affect mediated 
the relationship between hope (assessed before the failure) and effort exerted as well as 
related performances after the failure. Such successes also may explain why higher levels 
of hope have related to greater life satisfaction and higher overall positive mental health. 
Indeed, higher-hope people have been found to have better mental health status across a 
gamut of disorders. For instance, one study (Range & Penton, 1994), found that 
individuals with higher hope scores experienced less suicidal ideation than their lower 
hope counterparts. Furthermore, several studies has found a link between higher hope 
scores and less depression (Chang, 1998; Kwon, 2000; Snyder et al., 1997; Snyder et al., 
1996), and less anxiety (Barnum et al., 1998; McNeal, 1997).  
Hope Theory has not been used to look at impulsivity however. It seems likely 
that hope could serve as a buffering factor for substance abuse, much like it protects 
individuals from negative mental health outcomes. Thus, an additional purpose of the 
current study was to assess if hope can affect discounting rates in individuals. 
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Present Study 
 The purpose of the present study was to assess the relationships between two 
measures of delay discounting in the past and future, the role that hope plays as a possible 
protective factor for impulsivity as measured by delay discounting, and to asses the 
relationship between delay discounting and anticipated events. The following hypotheses 
were proposed in the current study in relation to the measurement of delay discounting 
(1) the two measures of delay discounting were predicted to produce significantly 
correlated k-values for rewards hypothetically delivered in the future. (2) The two 
measures of delay discounting were predicted to produce significantly correlated k-values 
for rewards hypothetically delivered in the past. (3) The Delay Discounting Task would 
produce significantly correlated k-scores for rewards hypothetically delivered in the past 
and the future. (4) The Kirby Questionnaire would produce similar k-scores for rewards 
hypothetically delivered in the past and the future. A previous study, Yi et al. (2006) 
found that there were no systematic differences in discounting rates for future or past 
outcomes.  
Further, hope scores were used to determine if hope can serve as a potential 
protective factor for impulsivity as measured by delay discounting. Specifically it was 
predicted that, individuals with high hope scores would have significantly lower k-scores 
on the (5) Kirby questionnaire and the (6) Delay Discounting Task than individuals with 
low hope scores. Finally, the temporal distance of events listed in the Anticipated Events 
Task were compared to the discounting rates obtained from both measures of discounting 
to determine if individuals think of positive and negative events in both the past and 
future in a similar manner. Specifically, it was hypothesized that K-scores would be 
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significantly positively correlated with the temporal distance from the present of positive 
events which occurred (7) in the future and (8) the past, and k-scores would be positively 
correlated with negative events which occurred (9) in the future and (10) the past as 
indicated on the Anticipated Events Task. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Participants were 220 students (156 female, 64 male) currently enrolled at a large 
Midwestern University whose participation partially fulfilled requirements for 
psychology classes or for additional credits in said classes. The average age of 
participants was 20.31 years with a range from 18-54. Participants consisted of 
individuals from all classes and were fairly evenly distributed among freshman (19.2%), 
sophomores (29.9%), juniors (21.0%), and seniors (13.8%). The majority of participants 
self-identified as Caucasian (81.3%) followed by American Indian (7.6%), African 
American/Black (3.1%), Biracial (3.1%), Hispanic American/Latino/Latina (1.3%), 
Asian American (1.3%), and Other (.4%).  
Additionally, there were a considerable amount of participants who signed up for 
the study but never turned in the packet. For instance, during the fall 2007 semester, 202 
participants signed up for the study, 135 participants completed the study, and 67 did not 
complete the study. Thus, during this semester, the attrition rate for the study was 
approximately 33%. Unfortunately attrition data is not available for the remaining 
participants since the Experimetrix website deleted all data from previous semesters. In 
addition, demographic data for the non-completing participants was not collected so it is 
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not possible to determine whether participants who completed the study differed on 
demographic variables from non-completers. 
 
Measures 
Demographics. Demographic information was obtained from participants with 
regard to sex, age, ethnicity, and year in school. 
Delay Discounting. Delay discounting was assessed using two different methods. 
First, the 27-item questionnaire developed by Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999) was used. 
The questionnaire presents a series of choices between a smaller, more immediate reward 
and a larger, more delayed reward and participants are instructed to indicate their 
preferences. Each of the nine possible discounting rates (k values) is assessed with three 
questions. One such item offers a choice between “$67 today” and “$75 in 119 days.” 
The wording was changed slightly for the questionnaire assessing past discounting rates 
to a choice between “$67 one hour ago” and “$75 received 119 days ago.” A subjective 
evaluation that these values are equal or an indifference point for this question indicates a 
k value of .0010. If an individual chose the immediate reward, their k value would be 
larger than .0010, whereas if they chose the delayed reward, their k would be assumed to 
be lower than .0010. A geometric mean was calculated for the point where an individual 
switches from preferring immediate rewards to preferring delayed rewards and this was 
treated as an individual’s k-value. 
The second method for assessing delay discounting in the current study was 
modeled after the technique used in the Yi et al. (2006) study. The Delay Discounting 
Task presents individuals with 40 choices per page. In the left column, a constant amount 
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was presented (either $10 or $10,000) and in the right column, increasing or decreasing 
alternatives to this value were presented in 2.5% increments. Individuals were asked to 
mark the choice they prefer. In addition, several values varied including magnitude ($10 
or $10,000), time to receipt of delayed reward (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 
or 5 years), and time period (past or future). The point at which an individual switches 
from preferring the immediate reward to preferring the delayed reward was then 
identified for each reward magnitude and time to receipt of reward. The k-score for each 
participant was determined by plotting all indifference points for each magnitude and 
time period individually in a non-linear regression using equation 1.   
Anticipated Events Task. How individuals look at future and past events was 
assessed using the Anticipated Events Task, which asks participants to write down 20 
different events occurring at different time periods (future or past) and possessing 
different valence (positive or negative events). In addition, participants are instructed to 
indicate when this event occurred or when they think it will occur. The time period was 
then assessed to see how far in the future or past each individual tended to look. This task 
was piloted in the current study.   
Revised Trait Hope Scale (HS-R2; Shorey & Snyder, 2004a): The HS-R2 is an 
18-item self-report measure that uses six-items each to assess the three hope components 
of goals, pathways, and agency. Response options on the 8-point Likert-type scale range 
from 1 = definitely false, to 8 = definitely true. Half of the items are reverse scored. In 
assessing the validity of the revised scale, Shorey and Snyder (2004) found that each of 
the three hope components is positively related (correlations from .54 to .68) yet 
empirically distinct. As such, the subscales can be used individually or they can be 
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combined as a unified hope measure. Across multiple college student samples, 
reliabilities for the subscales ranged from .64 to .81 while overall scale reliabilities 
ranged from .86 to .88. The revised scale, relative to the original (Snyder et al., 1991), is 
a stronger predictor of various criterion variables including self-efficacy, and 
psychological distress and well-being. HS-R2 scores were not related to performance 
goals, hypercompetitive attitudes, or pessimism.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were identified through the Oklahoma State University Psychology 
Department subject pool. This subject pool is organized through an internet based system 
called Experimetrix.  After they signed up, they were given a URL address 
(http://fp.okstate.edu/collinslab/collin/) for a PDF copy of the study.  They were 
instructed to download this PDF and to print a copy. The instructions for downloading 
and printing the PDF file were provided online. Participants then completed the informed 
consent, read the instructions and completed all measures. Copies of the informed 
consent (Appendix A) and the PDF file (Appendix B) are attached. Upon completion, the 
participants returned the packet of measures to room 232 in North Murray and were 
awarded credit. American Psychological Association (APA) ethical standards (ES 6.10 - 
6.19, APA, 2002) were followed strictly in relation to all participants. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
Means, standard deviations, and possible ranges of all measured variables are 
presented in Table 1. The means of the Kirby questionnaire are within ranges reported by 
Kirby et al. (1999) and the means of the Delay Discounting Task are within the ranges 
reported by Green, Myerson, and McFadden (1997). The means for the Revised Hope 
Scale and the Anticipated Events Task could not be compared to those obtained in the 
literature because there are currently no published studies utilizing either measure (see 
Table 1). Table 2 displays how many participants had data that could be scored for each 
measure. In other words, if individuals did not complete enough questions or a certain 
questionnaire as a whole, scores for that measure could not be calculated. Responses to 
the Kirby questionnaire require additional attention because the scoring methods do not 
include participants who respond inconsistently to the questions. If it appears that an 
individual is switching their preferences arbitrarily between immediate and delayed 
rewards, their responses cannot be scored. 
Zero-order correlations between the Kirby questionnaire and the standard money 
choice task are presented in Table 3. A Bonferroni adjustment was performed (p < .008) 
to control for possible Type I error inflation. Results indicated that all measures of delay 
discounting were significantly positively related to one another consistent with 
hypotheses 1-4. The smallest relationship was between the k-scores from the past 
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condition on the Kirby questionnaire and the future $10 reward condition on the Delay 
Discounting Task (r = .31,  p <.01) and the largest relationship between the k-scores from 
the past and future conditions of the Kirby questionnaire (r = .79,  p <.01).  
 To test hypothesis 5, two linear regressions were conducted with hope as the 
independent variable and the k-scores from the Kirby questionnaire in future and past 
time conditions as a dependent variable. To control for Type I error inflation, a 
Bonferroni adjustment was conducted and results were not treated as significant unless p 
< .025. The linear regression between hope and the Kirby questionnaire in the future 
indicated that hope was a significant predictor of delay discounting [B = -.001, t(171) = -
2.849, p(2-tailed) = .005] with hope accounting for 4.5% of the variance in k-scores. 
Further, using hope scores as a predictor for the k-score obtained from the past Kirby 
questionnaire found marginally significant results [B = -.001, t(141) = -2.157, p(2-tailed) 
= .033] with hope accounting for 3.2% of the variance in k-scores. Therefore, hypothesis 
5 was partially supported. 
To test hypothesis 6, hope was assessed as a predictor of the k-scores obtained 
from the Delay Discounting Task using four linear regressions. Again, a Bonferroni 
adjustment was conducted such that results were not accepted as significant unless p < 
.0125. Results indicated that hope did not predict the k-scores of the past $10,000 
condition of the Delay Discounting Task [B = -.00004, t(216) = -2.286, p(2-tailed) = 
.023] the past $10 condition [B =  .000, t(215) = -1.938, p(2-tailed) = .054], the future 
$10 condition [B = .000, t(215) = -1.478, p(2-tailed) = .141], or the future $10,000 
condition[B = .000, t(215) = -1.476, p(2-tailed) = .141]. Therefore, hypothesis 6 was not 
supported.  
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 To test hypotheses 7-10, bivariate Pearson’s correlations were conducted between 
the temporal distance of events in the Anticipated Events Task and all the k-scores 
obtained from both methods of assessing delay discounting. After adjusting for Type I 
error rate inflation (p < .005) results indicated that none of the k-scores were significantly 
correlated with the temporal distance of events in the Anticipated Events Task (see 
Tables 4 and 5). Thus, hypotheses 7-10 were not supported. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The present study had several aims. First, to evaluate the similarity of the results 
obtained from two different measures of delay discounting in both past and future time 
periods. Secondly, this study aimed to determine if hope significantly predicts 
discounting scores and, lastly, to determine if delay discounting scores were significantly 
correlated with the temporal distance of events listed on the Anticipated Events Task. 
 Results indicated that discounting scores in the future time condition obtained 
from both methods of assessing delay discounting were highly correlated. Additionally, 
results indicated that discounting scores in the past were also highly correlated regardless 
of the assessment method used (the Delay Discounting Task or the Kirby questionnaire). 
Further, individuals tended to discount rewards similarly regardless of the time period of 
their hypothetical delivery (future or past). These results may indicate that individuals 
think about the past and future in similar ways such that, if they are likely to discount the 
value of a delayed reward in the future, they are also likely to discount the value of a 
delayed reward in the past. Since all measures of delay discounting were highly 
correlated—r’s ranging from .32 to .79—these results also indicate that both methods are 
assessing the construct of delay discounting.    
 The results of hypotheses 1-4 replicate and extend the results of the Yi et al. 
(2006) study such that both measures of delay discounting (the Delay Discounting Task 
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and the Kirby questionnaire) produce similar k-scores in both past in future time 
conditions. There is also further indication that individuals tend to think about rewards in 
the past and present time domains similarly. This excessive focus on the present with 
little weight given to events in either the past or the future could serve as one possible 
explanation why individuals with substance use problems tend to engage in behavior 
despite possible negative outcomes in the future (i.e. missing work) and negative 
outcomes that have occurred in the past (i.e. drug related arrests). In addition, these 
individuals may not process relevant positive outcomes that could occur if the individual 
did not engage in substance use in the past and the future. For example, an individual 
who abuses alcohol may not account for the fact that when they did not use in the past 
positive things occurred (such as staying out of legal trouble) and positive things could 
possibly occur in the future (such as no hangover the next day). 
 The second purpose of the current study (hypotheses 5 and 6) was to assess if 
hope could predict delay discounting scores. These hypotheses were partially supported 
such that the k-scores derived from the questionnaire method in both time periods (past 
and future) were significantly predicted by hope scores, although the past k-scores were 
marginally significant after adjusting for Type I error inflation. However, the k-scores 
from the Delay Discounting Task were not significantly predicted by hope scores. Since 
the Delay Discounting Task was significantly more involved and consisted of dozens of 
pages to obtain k-scores, it is possible that these k-scores were not as reliable as those 
obtained from the Kirby questionnaire. Indeed, it was evident that a significant proportion 
of individuals were responding inconsistently or improperly to the task indicating 
possible boredom or frustration with the task (see Table 6). It should be noted that 
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although a relatively high proportion of individuals responded inconsistently to some 
items on the Delay Discounting Task, overall k-scores for each time condition and reward 
value could still be estimated for the majority of the participants by not including 
inconsistent responses.   
Despite this, results from the Kirby questionnaire indicated that individuals with 
high hope scores tended to have lower discounting scores indicating slower rates of 
discounting. Since delay discounting is commonly conceptualized as a behavioral 
measure of impulsivity, these results seem to indicate that hope may play a protective 
role in the development of disorders related to impulsivity such as Alcohol/Drug Abuse 
and Dependence and Pathological Gambling. Although Hope Theory has commonly been 
studied in relation to mental health (See Snyder, 2002), no previous study has looked at 
hope in relation to impulsivity. Thus, these results may have implication for the 
assessment and treatment of individuals with impulsivity related disorders such as 
substance use and pathological gambling problems, since individuals with high hope tend 
to focus on many attainable, yet challenging goals, have more effective strategies and 
more motivation to attain these goals (Snyder et al. 1991). Specifically, it is likely that 
individuals in treatment who have higher hope scores would be more likely to 
successfully complete treatment and stay clean or sober than their lower-hope 
counterparts due to their better coping strategies. Further, individuals in treatment with 
low hope scores may benefit from interventions created to increase hope (Snyder, 1994). 
 Finally, hypotheses 7-10 predicted that k-scores would be significantly related to 
the temporal distance of events listed in the Anticipated Events Task. Since individuals 
who discount more steeply seem to place greater emphasis on the present time relative to 
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both the past and future, it seemed probable that they would view significant life events 
in the future and past differently than low discounters. Specifically, hypotheses 7-10 
predicted that individuals with higher discounting scores would list events that were 
temporally closer to the present than individuals with lower discounting scores. However, 
results indicated that k-scores were not significantly related to the temporal distances of 
positive and negative events in both the past and future. It is possible that the predicted 
relationship did not occur because the instructions of the measure were too general. For 
instance, some participants responded with specific dates (i.e. “September 2010”) while 
others used a more general metric (i.e. “next summer”) and still others did not put a 
quantifiable date (i.e. “sometime in my life”). In addition, there was considerable 
variability in the number of events that individuals listed for each of the questions (0-5 
events). In future studies, it would be advisable to change the directions (i.e. ask for 
specific dates the events occurred or are expected to occur) of this task to obtain more 
reliable results.  
 The present study was not without limitations. Specifically, the participants of the 
current study consisted of undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes. Thus, 
this sample is not representative of the population in general. It may be possible that 
individuals in the general population think about outcomes in the past and future 
differently than individuals in this college sample. However, many studies looking at 
delay discounting include samples of drug abusing individuals such as heroin users, 
(Kirby & Petry, 2004; Kirby et al., 1999; Madden et al., 1999; Madden et al., 1997; 
Odum et al., 2000) cocaine users, (Coffey et al., 2003; Heil et al., 2006; Kirby & Petry, 
2004) and individuals who abuse other drugs such as methamphetamines (Hoffman et al., 
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2006). Results from these studies indicate that substance abusing individuals tend to have 
higher discounting rates than non-substance abusing control participants. Thus, it is likely 
that college participants have lower discounting rates and the effects found in the current 
study may underestimate the effect in the general population. 
 The second limitation was that all the measures of delay discounting were 
assessing for only positive outcomes (gains) and not negative outcomes (losses). It is 
possible that individuals think about gains differently than losses in past and future time 
periods. As mentioned earlier, research tends to support the sign effect such that 
individuals usually discount gains more rapidly than losses (Baker et al., 2003; Benzion, 
1989; Chapman, 1996; MacKeigan, 1993; Shelley, 1993; Thaler, 1981). Thus, future 
research should look at the discounting of gains and losses in past and future time 
domains. 
 Future research should focus on several areas. First, although these results may 
suggest that hope could serve as a protective factor for impulsivity and, thus, substance 
use disorders, substance use was not assessed in the current study. It is necessary to 
replicate the predictive role of hope in delay discounting and extend these findings by 
testing for relationships between substance use and hope. Further, it is possible that hope 
scores could serve as a mediator or a moderator of the relationship between delay 
discounting and substance use. Additionally, further research should attempt to reassess a 
possible predictive role of hope on delay discounting scores obtained from the Delay 
Discounting Task. As mentioned earlier, many participants responded inconsistently or 
incorrectly to several pages of the Delay Discounting Task which is a possible reason that 
hope did not significantly predict the discounting scores from this task. To test this 
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possibility, future studies should administer the task in person to ensure that the 
participants are responding correctly.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Possible Ranges 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Possible Range 
Kirby questionnaire future .0325 .0394 .1600 
Kirby questionnaire past .0366 .0425 .1600 
DD task future $10 .0154 .0212 .0609 
DD task future $10,000 .0023 .0039 .0152 
DD task past $10 .0186 .0227 .0632 
DD task past $10,000 .0021 .0037 .0155 
Hope 113.68* 13.96 69.00 
Goals 37.66* 5.44 34.00 
Pathways 36.43* 5.50 28.00 
Agency 39.56* 5.85 26.00 
AET future positive 2130.40* 1824.34 17140.20 
AET future negative 4921.90* 5087.51 21900.00 
AET past positive 1605.99* 1531.94 14570.00 
AET past negative 1718.93* 1408.08 12161.00 
*Observed means could not be compared to means reported in the literature because this 
information is not currently available in the literature 
 
Table 2: Number of participants with data that could be scored per measure 
 
KQF KQP DDT Hope Goals Pathways Agency Future 
Pos 
Future 
Neg 
Past 
Pos 
Past 
Neg 
175 144 219 217 218 217 218 213 200 206 207 
KQF = Kirby questionnaire Future Rewards, KQP = Kirby questionnaire Past Rewards, 
DDT = All Delay Discounting Task k-scores, Future Pos = AET future positive events, 
Future Neg = AET future negative events, Past Pos = AET past positive events, Past Neg 
= AET past negative events 
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Table 3: Zero-order correlations between the Kirby questionnaire and the Delay 
Discounting Task  
 
 KQF KQP DDTF 10 DDTP 10 DDTF 10,000 DDTP 10,000 
KQF 1      
KQP .79** 1     
DDTF 10 .33** .31** 1    
DDTP 10 .34** .35** .62** 1   
DDTF 10,000 .36** .39** .54** .41** 1  
DDTP 10,000 .52** .48** .44** .52** .75** 1 
* = p < . 05; ** = p < .01; KQF = Kirby questionnaire Future Rewards, KQP = Kirby 
questionnaire Past Rewards, DDTF 10 =  Delay Discounting Task Future $10 Rewards, 
DDTP 10 =  Delay Discounting Task Past $10 Rewards, DDTF 10,000 = Delay 
Discounting Task Future $10,000 Rewards, DDTP 10,000 = Delay Discounting Task Past 
$10,000 Rewards  
 
 
 
Table 4: Zero-order correlations between the Kirby questionnaire and the Anticipated 
Events Task (AET) 
 
 KQF KQP Future Pos Future Neg Past Pos Past Neg 
KQF 1      
KQP .79** 1     
Future Pos -.08 -.05 1    
Future Neg -.16* -.12 .49** 1   
Past Pos -.07 -.10 .14* .07 1  
Past Neg .03 .08 .03 .01 .20** 1 
* = p < . 05; ** = p < .01; KQF = Kirby questionnaire Future Rewards, KQP = Kirby 
questionnaire Past Rewards, Future Pos = AET future positive events, Future Neg = AET 
future negative events, Past Pos = AET past positive events, Past Neg = AET past 
negative events 
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Table 5: Zero-order correlations between the Delay Discounting Task and the Anticipated 
Events Task (AET) 
 
 DDTF 
10 
DDTP 
10 
DDTF 
10,000 
DDTP 
10,000 
Future 
Pos 
Future 
Neg 
Past 
Pos 
Past 
Neg 
DDTF 
10 
1        
DDTP 
10 
.62** 1       
DDTF 
10,000 
.54** .41** 1      
DDTP 
10,000 
.44** .52** .75** 1     
Future 
Pos 
.08 .07 -.14* .01 1    
Future 
Neg 
.08 .05 .02 -.02 .49** 1   
Past 
Pos 
-.08 .02 .08 -.06 .14* .07 1  
Past 
Neg 
-.01 .02 -.02 .04 .03 .01 .20** 1 
  * = p < . 05; ** = p < .01; DDTF 10 =  Delay Discounting Task Future $10 Rewards, DDTP 
10 =  Delay Discounting Task Past $10 Rewards, DDTF 10,000 = Delay Discounting Task Future 
$10,000 Rewards, DDTP 10,000 = Delay Discounting Task Past $10,000 Rewards, Future Pos = 
AET future positive events, Future Neg = AET future negative events, Past Pos = AET 
past positive events, Past Neg = AET past negative events 
 
 
Table 6: Consistency of responding on the Delay Discounting Task 
 
 DDTF 10 DDTP 10 DDTF 10,000 DDTP 10,000 
Consistent 109 78 167 133 
Inconsistent 111 142 53 87 
DDTF 10 =  Delay Discounting Task Future $10 Rewards, DDTP 10 =  Delay Discounting Task 
Past $10 Rewards, DDTF 10,000 = Delay Discounting Task Future $10,000 Rewards, DDTP 
10,000 = Delay Discounting Task Past $10,000 Rewards 
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